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Response to Paul N. Halvonik
By JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP and RICHARD W. GERRY
In his article on the exclusionary rule that appears in this issue of
the Hastings Law Journal, Mr. Halvonik makes an appeal for the con-
tinued enforcement of the fourth amendment. He contrasts the real
protections provided by the amendment with the meaningless language
of its counterpart in the Soviet Constitution. We share these senti-
ments. Because SCA 7 provides for the exclusion of evidence when
required by the United States Constitution, it assures the continued en-
forcement of the fourth amendment. Indeed, SCA 7 strengthens the
fourth amendment, because it prevents California courts from relying
on nonstatutory grounds to exclude evidence obtained as a result of a
search or seizure that meets that amendment's requirement of reasona-
bleness. Today in California the fourth amendment has become practi-
cally meaningless because California courts have set a more stringent
standard than that mandated by the amendment.
Mr. Halvonik, however, believes that the rights of the people of
this state will suffer if California courts are unable to exclude evidence
on nonstatutory independent state grounds. For example, he believes
that the abolition by SCA 7 of the vicarious exclusionary rule would
impinge upon these rights. Besides California, only one other state-
Louisiana-has adopted this rule.' Can it be that California and Loui-
siana have a monopoly of judicial wisdom, to the exclusion of the re-
maining forty-eight states and the federal courts as well? If the
vicarious exclusionary rule is necessary to protect the people ade-
quately from illegal police conduct, then why haven't more states
adopted it? Does a resident of California suddenly feel less secure
when he or she crosses the California border, because an adjacent state
follows the federal rule of standing?
As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, "Each time
the exclusionary rule is applied it exacts a substantial social cost for the
vindication of Fourth Amendment rights. Relevant and reliable evi-
dence is kept from the trier of fact and the search for truth at trial is
deflected."' 2 The federal rule of standing permits a defendant to move
1. See Van de Kamp & Gerry, Refaorming the Exclusionary Rule: An Analysis of Two
Proposed Amendments to the California Constitution, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1109, 1121 n.85
(1982).
2. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978).
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to exclude evidence if his or her fourth amendment rights were vio-
lated.3 In light of the high social cost of the exclusionary rule, the
Court properly has rejected the argument "that the additional benefits
of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify
further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those ac-
cused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of
all the evidence which exposes the truth."
4
If California truly requires a more stringent standard than that
mandated by the federal Constitution, under SCA 7 the legislature will
have the opportunity to enact legislation establishing an enforcement
mechanism for the stricter standard. Thus, one need not be concerned
that the passage of SCA 7 would have an adverse impact upon the
people of this state, for the legislature has the ability and duty to re-
spond to the needs of the people by enacting appropriate legislation.
The enactment of the California Right to Financial Privacy Act
5
shows that when the legislature believes California needs a more strin-
gent standard, it does take action necessary to enforce that standard.
The Act affords greater protection than does United States v. Miller6 to
the confidentiality of bank records. The legislature provided several
different remedies for a violation of the Act, including penal and civil
sanctions and injunctive relief, as well as the exclusion of evidence,
7
thereby going beyond the exclusionary remedy provided by Burrows v.
Superior Court.8
Mr. Halvonik has made a number of other contentions in his arti-
cle, which we now address:
1) We are not suggesting the repeal of the California Constitu-
tion in criminal proceedings. SCA 7 would affect the constitution only
in a very narrow area.
2) We do not disapprove of the holdings in People v. Triggs9 and
Bielicki v. Superior Court.10 We criticized these cases because they re-
lied on both the federal and state constitutions to exclude evidence,
thereby foreclosing review by the United States Supreme Court of the
California court's interpretation of federal law. 1
3. Id. at 140.
4. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969).
5. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 7460-7493 (West 1976).
6. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
7. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 7485, 7487, 7489 (West 1976).
8. 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974).
9. 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973).
10. 57 Cal. 2d 602, 371 P.2d 288, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1962).
11. Mr. Halvonik apparently believes that SCA 7 would undermine Triggs and Bie-
llcki. This is not necessarily so. Because the holdings in these cases were based on both the
federal and state constitutions, under SCA 7 the court's interpretation would remain binding
on California courts unless the United States Supreme Court held to the contrary. As the
United States Supreme Court has not so held, the passage of SCA 7 would not place Triggs
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3) We are not critical of Burrows v. Superior Court.12 The trailer
bill (SB 1092) to SCA 7 provides for the exclusion of evidence seized in
violation of Burrows.
13
4) Under the federal rule of standing, Daniel Ellsberg would
have been able to move to suppress evidence illegally seized from his
patient file by the "plumbers." Dr. Fielding was Ellsberg's psychiatrist.
It is well established that a patient who seeks psychiatric treatment has
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the relationship with his or her
psychiatrist.14 The search of Ellsberg's file, therefore, violated his
fourth amendment rights.'
5
5) The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would not
encourage the police to be ignorant of the law. The exception would
apply only when a police officer's good faith mistake of law was reason-
able. A reasonable police officer would not be deliberately ignorant of
the law. Thus, the good faith exception usually would apply when the
officer was aware of the relevant law, but had made a good faith, rea-
sonable mistake in applying the law to the facts.
To conclude, SCA 7 would substantially benefit the public by ad-
mitting relevant, truthful evidence currently excluded on nonstatutory
independent state grounds. The admission of this evidence would per-
mit the prosecution of criminal offenders who cannot be prosecuted
under present California law, and it would enhance the reliability of
the fact-finding process at trial. SCA 7 would accomplish this benefit
without adversely affecting the rights of the people of this state. Be-
cause SCA 7 enables the legislature to exclude evidence, the legislature
will have the opportunity to codify those exclusionary rules not man-
dated by the federal Constitution that it believes are necessary for the
protection of the public.
and Bielicki in any immediate danger. Furthermore, although Smayda v. United States, 352
F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965), is contrary to Triggs and Bielicki, a later federal case-Kroehler v.
Scott, 391 F.Supp. 1114, 1118 (E.D. Pa. 1975),-is contrary to Smayda and expressly ap-
proves Triggs and Bieiicki. Of course, even if the United States Supreme Court were to
overrule the interpretation of federal law in Triggs and Bielicki, under SCA 7 the legislature
would have the power to codify the exclusionary rule of these cases.
12. 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974).
13. SB 1092 and SCA 7 have been presented to the legislature as a single package. For
further discussion of SB 1092, see Van de Kamp & Gerry, Reforming the Exclusionary Rule:
An Ana lsis of Two Proposed Amendments to the California Constitution, 33 HASTINGS L.L
1109, 1111 n.8 (1982).
14. Inre Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 431-32, 467 P.2d 557, 567-68, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 839-
40 (1970).
15. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
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